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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
On appeal, Mr. Brown asserts that the district court erred in denying several of
his pre-trial motions, from which he reserved the right to appeal as part of a conditional
guilty plea to charges of voluntary manslaughter and accessory after the fact to grand
theft, and abused its discretion with respect to his Rule 35 motion. In its Respondent's
Brief, the State makes a number of arguments, including claiming that Mr. Brown's
Motion to Exclude Mail Correspondence was properly denied.

This Reply Brief is

necessary to respond to the State's argument on that issue. With respect to the State's
other arguments, Mr. Brown will rely on the arguments set forth in his Appellant's Brief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Brown's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown's Motion to Exclude from Evidence
Defendant's Mail Correspondence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Brown's Motion To Exclude From Evidence
Defendant's Mail Correspondence Obtained In Violation Of The Fourth Amendment
In advancing its argument against Mr. Brown's claim, the State misunderstands
and misrepresents the scope of Mr. Brown's argument, and incorrectly argues that a
factual basis was established to support the district court's factual findings when no
evidence was presented to support the findings. The State's argument suffers from a
further flaw in that it relies on an overly-broad reading of the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision in Mallery v. Lewis, 106 Idaho 227 (1984).
With respect to its misunderstanding and misrepresentation of Mr. Brown's
argument, the State asserts, "The district court found there was a jail policy in place
'regarding communications from prisoners' (Tr., p.371, L.25 - p.372, L.2), and this
finding has not been challenged." (Respondent's Brief, p.9 (emphasis added).) This is
absolutely false.

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Brown argued, inter alia, "In making its

ruling, the district court assumed the existence of a jail policy when no evidence was
presented of such a policy in place."

(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)

Later in his brief,

Mr. Brown argued, "the district court ... relied on a non-existent jail policy to justify its
holding .... " It is difficult to imagine a clearer articulation of a challenge to a district
court's factual finding.
With respect to the State's incorrect argument that a factual basis existed to
support the district court's factual findings, the State argues,
Even if the Court were to require a basis for a warrantless search in the
screening of outgoing inmate correspondence, the district court found that
as well. The arguments presented to the district court at [the] hearing on
the motion to exclude included information of Brown's extensive criminal
history, his previous possession of identity fraud documents, his
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communications with convicted felons incarcerated elsewhere and his
continued communications with other people charged with violent crimes,
all [of] which showed Brown presented security issues to the jail that
justified the review of his outgoing correspondence. (See generally,
Tr., pp.368-370.) The district court not only found a valid government
interest in screening Brown's mail but held the circumstances surrounding
Brown's behavior and pattern of communications while incarcerated was
sufficient probable cause to search his mail. (Tr., p.372, Ls.11-19.) The
district court correctly denied Brown's motion to exclude.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10 (emphasis added).)

The State also asserted, without

citing to any evidence in support, that Mr. Brown's "argument fails" in part because "the
state acted within its general practice .... " (Respondent's Brief, p.S.) The problem
with the State's argument is that it incorrectly assumes that the State presented
evidence at the hearing on Mr. Brown's suppression motion, when the State did nothing

more than present argument from counsel.
As Mr. Brown noted in his Appellant's Brief, a warrantless search is presumed to
be unreasonable and violative of the Fourth Amendment, with the burden on the State
to establish that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement justifies such a
search.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.)

While Mr. Brown does not dispute that the

prosecuting attorney presented argument on the suppression motion, the State did not
present any evidence - in the form of affidavits, sworn testimony, or judicially-noticed
facts - to support those arguments. As such, the district court's factual findings are not
supported by any evidence - let alone the substantial evidence necessary to allow this
Court to accept such findings.

See State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302 (2007) (on

appeal, "the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported
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by substantial evidence .... ,,).1 The absence of any evidence in the record, including a
copy of any jail policy that was in place at the time of the searches and seizures
conducted in this case, means that the district court's factual findings are absolutely
unsupported and cannot be relied upon by this Court on appeal.
Finally, the State asserts that the "prevailing view" is "that there is no
constitutional violation in the review of inmate jail [sic]," which is the result of an overlybroad reading of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Mal/ery and the non-controlling
authority to which the State also cites. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-9.) The first problem
with the State's argument is that the Supreme Court's decision in Mal/ery, a habeas
corpus action brought by inmates of the Canyon County Jail, did not involve the

wholesale copying and distribution of inmate mail practiced in Mr. Brown's case. The
facts of Mallery that distinguish it from those of Mr. Brown's case are obvious from the
following findings of fact made by the district court in Mal/ery, namely,
[T]hat the inmates' general correspondence, incoming and outgoing, is
screened by officials, i.e., read for basic content and the envelope
checked for contraband . . . . When booked into the jail, prisoners are
asked to sign a consent form consenting to the screening of general
correspondence. If the form is not signed, the mail is not screened but
rather is held until the inmate's release.

It is clear that the screening of mail for escape plans, obscene material,
violation of prison rules, and contraband furthers a substantial
governmental interest ....
Mallery, 106 Idaho at 232 (emphasis added). In Mr. Brown's case, unlike the facts in
Mal/ery, the State did not present any evidence that he was made aware of, let alone

1 It is noteworthy that the State cited to, and quoted from, this portion of Diaz in its
Respondent's Brief. (Respondent's Brief, p.5.)
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consented to, the wholesale copying and distribution of his non-privileged mail, which it
conceded was done in this case. (Tr., p.366, Ls.16-17.) Furthermore, the State did not
establish, through the presentation of any evidence, that the wholesale copying and
distribution of Mr. Brown's mail was for institutional security purposes, let alone
pursuant to an established jail policy.

Finally, the wholesale photocopying and

distribution of Mr. Brown's mail to investigators and the prosecuting attorney's office is a
far cry from the "screening" of inmate mail described in Mallery and the non-binding
precedent cited to by the State. 2

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, and in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Brown
respectfully requests that this Court grant the relief that he requested in his Appellant's
Brief.
DATED this 9th day of January, 2013.

SPENCERJ.HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

The claim brought by the inmates in Mallery involved First Amendment rights, not
Fourth Amendment rights.
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